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Abstract
As a result of the division of Indian sub-continent 
Pakistan was created as a sovereign, independent country 
in August 1947 while its eastern part became independent 
in December 1971 and formed the independent country 
called Bangladesh. The three independent countries of 
South Asia Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan have 
a Muslim majority population following Islam actively 
while India is a Hindu majority country having the 
followers of different religions. Although five countries–
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
have the tradition of political violence the problem of 
terrorism erupted in last four decades. It is a region 
of Jihadi–dominated terrorism which is nowhere near 
containment and it propagates the pernicious ideology 
of hate, revenge, and violence. It treats all conflicts 
with non-Muslims worthy of Jihadi and even considers 
liberal Islamic regimes, organisations and individuals as 
unIslamic. In most of the countries there are anti–terror 
laws but lack of political will to take effective and stern 
action against the terrorist have made the laws useless or 
partially useful. 
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India is bearing the burnt of the terrorist violence in 
South Asia which has risen sharply in recent years. It 
is facing multifarious challenges in the management 
of its internal security. There is an upsurge of terrorist 
activities, intensification of cross- border terrorist 
activities and insurgent groups in different parts of the 
country. Terrorism has now acquired global dimensions 
and has become the challenge for the world. The reach 
and methods adopted by terrorist groups and organisation 
take the advantage of modern means of communication 
and technology using high tech facilities available in the 
form of communication system, transport, sophisticated 
arms and various other means. This has enabled them to 
strike and create terror among people at will. Like every 
constitution of the world the constitution of India also 
provides for modifications in law to enable the state to 
face challenges to its unity and integrity and the security 
of its citizens. In fact the entire criminal justice system 
which gives the state the power to use force against its 
own citizens, going even to the extent of resorting to 
killing, is designed for the purpose (Menon, 2009). But 
in this age of globalisation the heightening levels of 
political and social consciousness have resulted in higher 
expectations by the people and consequently states and 
societies are coming under pressure (Kalkat,2006). The 
spectre of terrorism haunts us as an omnipotent and 
omnipresent phenomenon. Living in fear of terrorist 
attacks is almost becoming today the way of life.
The Indian constitution, born in difficult times after 
partition, does provide for a legal regime which can 
accommodate restrictions on liberty, the standards of 
which can vary depending on the gravity of the challenge 
and the risks involved for basic rights and constitutional 
values. It is a secular system with pluralism as its 
foundation. Here, pluralism must not be confused with 
secularism. The latter carries overtones of atheism and 
was born out of twin struggles in the West: of democracy 
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with the Church and monarchy, and of Darwinism with 
Christianity. Pluralism, by contrast, involves no break 
with religion and what is more important, with tradition. 
Instead, it requires acceptance of, and mutual respect 
between, the many religions in a country. A pluralist 
state is also secular, but in a different way. For its legal 
and civil codes seek to accommodate and incorporate 
particular religious customs and beliefs and not banish 
them from the public domain (Jha, 2013). The Indian 
constitution safeguarded pluralism by creating an 
ethnic federation on the one hand, and by protecting the 
marriage, inheritance, educational and cultural practices 
of the minorities, on the other. The two sets of enactments 
gave Indians a security of identity that is the secret of 
modern India’s extraordinary stability. Every community 
wears its identity openly like a badge, because it does 
not feel threatened. In the absence of threat, no one feels 
pressured to conform. Historically, every Indian empire, 
from the Mauryan to the British, flourished because it 
respected the diversity of identities within India and 
treated all races and cultures as equal. 
P R O B L E M S  O F  I N D I A N  S O C I O -
POLITICAL LIFE
As an organising principle of social and political life, the 
separation of church and state has its origin in the vicious 
and debilitating 16th–century sectarian wars within 
European Christianity. Ultimately, the only way Western 
European societies could live with sectarian diversity was 
via the separation of church and state. Over time, with the 
rise to prominence of new social groups, long distance 
trade and industrial capitalism, these ideas were further 
reinforced. Religion was relegated to the domain of the 
private (Joshi, 2002). Public or political structures now 
had to be secular. It is the time when the rest of the world 
is being evaluated on their ability to imitate this European 
model, what we do need to recognise is that these ideas of 
public secularity were the product of a particular history, 
the result of a certain political, economic and social 
context. Asia, Africa, or the region we call the Middle 
East today, had historically developed their own methods 
of dispute resolution and dealing with diversity. These 
methods did not necessarily relegate religion to the realm 
of the personal. As a result, the European colonialism 
dismissed the methods as primitive or backward. However 
in India as elsewhere in the world, we have too many 
examples of how religious and indigenous ideologies have 
helped a few oppressed the many to be able to make a 
universal case for religion against secularity.
In fact, the plurality and diversity that we found 
today in Indian society, were existed in pre-1947 era and 
independent India was born with these contradictions. 
A dispassionate assessment of history will reveal that 
the violent outbursts that are tearing apart the fabric 
of Indian society today are expressions of the same 
contradictions–religious, class, ethnic, caste and otherwise 
that often exploded into violence even during the colonial 
period. Despite the Indian state’s declared profession of 
adherence to non–violence, in practice the Indian state has 
repeatedly resorted to the language of violence in trying 
to resolve these contradictions that plague Indian society 
(Banerjee, 1996, pp.81-82). In India’s case Independence 
was brought about through a non–violent mid–wife called 
‘Gandhism’, which is the state’s proclaimed ideology. For 
instance, the Hindu-Muslim communal riots that preceded 
the partition of the sub- continent and led to the birth of 
India, are a historical reality which not only knocks the 
bottom out of the Indian state’s official and ideological 
claim to its non–violent parentage, but also challenges the 
doctrine of non–violence as propounded by Gandhi as a 
harbinger of change.
The Indian state acquired a military character almost 
from its infancy. It started at two levels–external and 
internal. At the external level, the new born state sent 
its troops to Kashmir in October 1947 to fight first the 
Pakistan–aided tribals, and later the regular forces of the 
Pakistan army, in order to protect a territory which had 
been acceded hurriedly to the Indian Union by the then 
Maharaja of Kashmir. The Kashmir adventure of 1947 was 
followed by four major wars–the 1962 war with China, and 
the 1965, 1971 and 1999 wars with Pakistan. The internal 
sources of violence and militarisation can be traced back 
to the highly centralised model of development adopted 
by the post–Independence Indian state, which instead of 
eliminating semi–feudal production relations in large parts 
of the country opted for investment in selected sectors 
and regions. As a result, while inequitable distribution 
of income has sharpened class fragmentation and 
contradiction, uneven development has led to imbalances 
in regional growth (Pradhan, 1989, p.85). The perceived 
sense of injustice among the people divided them on the 
lines of caste, ethnic loyalties, language, religious beliefs–
which the Indian polity has failed to overcome, despite its 
commitment to a “socialist secular democratic republic”.
BEGINNING OF VIOLENCE IN INDIAN 
STATES
This apart, in initial years of independence India faced 
two such situation–the Telengana Movement in 1948 and 
Naga demand for independence in 1953. The Telengana 
movement was one of the earliest indications of the Indian 
state’s attitude towards the underprivileged and of its 
determination to suppress violently any attempt by the rural 
people to end outmoded social and economic relations. 
The same treatment was meted out to an ethnic minority 
group when the state sent its armed forces to Nagaland to 
suppress the Naga demand for independence. The core of 
the conflict between these various groups on the one hand, 
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and the Centre on the other, basically concerns how to 
find an amicable solution to relations between the central 
authority and different regional communities that inhabit 
a multi–national state. Keeping in view the dangers ahead 
the Indian state also augmented throughout the years its 
repressive apparatus. In 1949, it raised the Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF), modelled on the British government’s 
plan of Crown Representative Police Force (Pradhan, 1989, 
pp.85-86). Since then, the number of central paramilitary 
forces has increased steadily, with the formation of Border 
Security Force (BSF), the Central Industrial Security 
Force (CISF), the National Security Guard (NSG) and the 
commando force called “Black Cats”.
Gradually, the pattern of state response towards 
popular grievances followed a common sequence of policy 
decisions and actions–whether in relation to demands of 
poor peasants, industrial workers or ethnic minorities. 
At the initial stage of any demonstration of popular 
demands, the state then decides to ignore them. When 
accumulation of the ignored grievances manifests itself 
in desperate militant agitation, the state decides to treat 
them as law and order problems and deploy its police to 
suppress them. Such deployment often helps the state to 
contain the outbursts temporarily and prevent them from 
exploding into armed insurgencies. But the same situation 
and response had a different meaning and depth when the 
affected area is situated in Border States. They witness, 
normally, better–armed and better–organised insurgencies 
as the case is in north-west and north eastern states. 
However, there is a basic difference between the political 
character of the Naxalite armed movement and that of the 
insurgencies in other parts of the country. While the former 
seeks to base itself on the politics of class conflict, the 
latter are concerned with more general issues and concerns 
related to their respective communities, irrespective of 
class differences that might otherwise divide them.
The region north–east is a compact zone of sub-
national states attributing to high levels of ethnic 
violence. It is comprised by extraordinary ethnic, cultural, 
religious and linguistic diversity and constituted the seven 
sister states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. The region 
is inhabited by three distinct groups of people; the hill 
tribes, the plain tribes and non–tribal population of the 
plains. Geographically, the north–east of India is located 
between the two great traditions of the Indic Asia and the 
Mongoloid Asia. It was only after the British had merged 
the entire region under the British India administration 
that the region came to be associated with India 
(Shivananda, 2009, pp.29-31). Ethnically, it is diverse and 
heterogeneous alike the rest of the country.
Historically, immigration from the East–Bengal 
now Bangladesh, became illegal after the demarcation 
of international boundary in 1947 between India and 
Pakistan.  But movement of people from East Bengal, later 
East Pakistan and then Bangladesh into different parts of 
North–east India continued unabatedly. This has primarily 
generated a multiple cause for destabilising political, 
social, economic, ethnic and communal tensions in the 
region. Large scale and unabated influx of population from 
the neighbouring countries has resulted in a phenomenon 
that is visibly reshaping and transforming the demographic, 
ethnic, religious and linguistic profile of large parts of 
the region. Consequently, the region has opened up to 
radicalism and to a network of fundamentalist campaigns 
which have access to arms and easy connections to 
sanctuaries across the porous international borders 
which had made difficult for the north eastern states to 
comprehend and address. The impact of ethnic–conflict on 
the security of the region and the nation is enormous and is 
adding to the problems of the northeastern people.
IDEOLOGY-RELATED VIOLENCE
In recent years the problem of Naxalism is posing a 
serious threat to the security of India, democracy and 
rule of law, particularly in Chattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, 
Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal and a few other 
places. It is said that over 230 districts in the country 
are in the grip of Maoists, Naxalites etc. and the Union 
Home Minister has declared that countering Naxalism 
is the biggest challenge (Rao, 2010, p.11). In the areas 
where the Naxalites have established their influence, they 
impose taxes mete out quick justice and run administrative 
bureaucracies, schools and health services. Naxalism 
unleashed a flow of events which escalated over the 
years into a political movement that brought about far–
reaching changes in India’s socio–cultural scene. The fact 
is that despite the continuing use of the most repressive 
methods by the police to crush its cadres and inspite of 
a series of splits that had fissured the movement during 
the next three or four decades, Naxalism as an ideology 
has become a force to reckon with in India. Its continuity 
can be explained by the persistence and exacerbation of 
the basic causes that gave it birth–feudal exploitation and 
oppression over the rural poor.
The term “Naxalism” typify a particular kind of 
militant and violent armed struggle by the peasants tribals, 
and dalits, led by a leadership drawing a doctrinal support 
from Marxism–Leninism and strategic inspiration from 
Mao Zedong. The term itself came from Naxalbari, a small 
village in West Bengal where a section of Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) led by Kanu Sanyal led a violent 
uprising in 1967. At the sametime Mao launched his 
Cultural Revolution and in India a group that broke 
away from the CPM, mobilised about 15,000 peasants in 
Naxalbari and launched a violent anti landlord movement, 
patterned on the Telengana movement two decades earlier 
(Koithara, 1999, pp.104-05). The Naxalites drew heavily 
upon the iniquitous land tenure system and exploitation of 
the poor peasants and agricultural labour by landlords in 
framing their ideological aims.
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In 1967, Naxalites organised the All India Coordination 
Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), 
which in 1969 gave birth to the most notable Naxalite 
organisation, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-
Leninist) and defined the objective of the Party as ‘seizure 
of power through an agrarian revolution’. The strategy was 
the elimination of feudal order in the Indian countryside to 
free the poor from the clutches of the oppressive landlords 
and replace the world order with an alternative one that 
would implement land reforms. The tactics to achieve it 
was through guerilla warfare by the peasants (Madhumita, 
2010, pp.27-29). This way they would eliminate the 
landlords and build up a resistance against the state’s police 
force. Gradually, they would set up a ‘liberated zone’ in 
different parts of the country that would eventually coalesce 
into a territorial unit under Naxalite hegemony.
Today Naxalism/Maoism has become a significant 
socio–political force having abiding faith in guerilla 
warfare and violent means to achieve its objectives. The 
government figures reveal that the total number of people 
killed by the Naxalites violence rose by 30% between 
2003 and 2005. The number of policemen killed jumped to 
an astonishing 53% between 2004 and 2005. The annual 
report of the Ministry of Home Affairs 2005-06 also 
admitted that the Naxalism is not merely a law and order 
problem but has deep socio–economic dimensions. Left 
wing radicalism and extremism is motivated by prevailing 
socio–economic deprivation (Madhumita, pp.27-29). 
The various groups of Maoists be they called Naxalites 
or Peoples War Group (PWG) or otherwise adjective, all 
have declared very clearly that they have no faith in the 
constitution of India, in the multi-party democracy and 
elections. There has to be a strategy by the government to 
fight the low–intensity war and promote good governance 
and development. Politically, the liberal democratic state 
in India needs to be critiqued of the economic policies 
that have created islands of deprivation, which have over 
the years emerged as pockets of support for the Maoist 
movement in the country.
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED/INSTIGATED 
VIOLENCE
In line the terror attacks and incidents appeared in 1980s 
in the Indian state of Punjab and Kashmir. This form of 
terrorism was different from organised mass movements, 
or guerilla warfare. Guerilla–based insurrections in China, 
Vietnam and Latin American countries in the past involved 
the willing participation of the local people, both in direct 
and indirect ways, but unlike those forms of armed struggle, 
the insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir are dominated 
by a leadership which aims at harnessing popular 
nationalistic urges to the objective of establishing theocratic 
autocracies in these states. The leadership of Punjab and 
Kashmir appeared to owe allegiance to a form of religious 
fundamentalism that aims at subjugating members of 
their respective communities to conservative norms and 
practices, selectively excerpted from their traditional 
religious scriptures and systems on the plea of restoring the 
fundamental purity of their respective religions (Banerjee, 
1996, p.87). Since terrorism without publicity is a weapon 
that fires only blank, such terrorist actions have had to be 
directed not only against representatives of the state like 
policemen, security forces and government officials, but 
also at gatherings of ordinary innocent citizens. Bomb blast 
in crowded places that kill indiscriminately a large number 
of people invariably become news and give the terrorist 
maximum publicity. In general, their ideology is intolerant 
of dissent views, and therefore, they also attack those 
members of their own community who refuge to accept 
their fundamentalist religious views.
In real the alienation of the Sikhs began at the time of 
the reorganisation of states in 1956 when they failed to get a 
Sikh majority state carved out of the then Hindu majority in 
Punjab. The relations between the two communities began 
to sour in 1960s and Punjabi farmers were discontended 
because they were bound to sell their commodities on prices 
fixed by the administrators. Rapid industrialisation and 
shift of the economic power from rural to urban areas also 
strengthened the feeling that identity of their religion was 
at stake. In the circumstances there was a perception that 
native Punjabi enterprise, combined with investment capital 
from the Sikh diaspora could make ‘Khalistan’ bloom 
in a manner that Punjab, mired in India’s administrative 
stodginess, could not hope to. On the other hand, the 
political needs of the Indian National Congress (INC) 
played a role in the final lap into insurgency. To undercut 
the electoral draw of the Sikh political party, the Akali 
Dal, the INC promoted Bhindranwale, a Sikh preacher 
even more radical than the Akalis. Initially Bhindranwale 
campaigned for the INC but soon became first choice of 
the Congress party in Punjab and was allowed to create an 
armed fortress in Amritsar’s Golden Temple. As a result, a 
two–day major military operation became essential in June 
1984 to clear the Golden Temple in which 83 dead and 248 
wounded (Koithara, 1999, pp.108-10). In Punjab, according 
to government count, nearly 500 civilians were killed in 
hit-and-run attacks during the period from 1980 to just 
before the June 1984. Temporary success in the cleaning 
up of the Golden Temple in “Operation Bluestar,’ the arrest 
and killing of few ‘terrorist’ leaders in Punjab have left a 
trail of destruction which gave birth to a new generation of 
insurgents in the state. Many among them–particularly the 
youth–go underground and joined the insurgency, either for 
protection or for revenge.
THE DEADLIEST FORM OF VIOLENCE
Terrorism and insurgency continued in Punjab between 
1984 and 1993 and during the period over 12,000 people 
were killed. The storming of the temple devastated the 
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Sikhs.  Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, 
was killed by her Sikh security guards four months later 
in October 1984 which in turn led to a violent anti–Sikh 
reaction that cold bloodedly killed about 3,000 Sikhs 
in the capital Delhi alone. After a one- year–long lull 
sparked by the rout of the temple militants, a fresh surge 
of terrorist violence broke out with the assassination of 
moderate Sikh leader Sant Harchand Singh Longowal 
shortly after he signed a so–called “Peace accord” with 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in July 1985. The intensity 
and frequency of terrorist attacks had risen sharply since 
late 1985, with no end in sight to the ever–growing 
spiral of violence. The extremists had extended their 
terror campaign to many areas outside Punjab forcing 
authorities to constantly review and beef up security in a 
prime terrorist target–New Delhi. The extremists, armed 
with powerful, sophisticated guns had often targeted 
government and police officers and Hindu and moderate 
Sikh politicians; but, frequently, they had been engaged 
in the random mass killing of ordinary Hindu civilians 
(Crosette, 1988). Several Sikh groups had helped turn the 
rich farms of Punjab into India’s “killing fields” (United 
States Department of State, 1988). They include the 
Khalistan Commando Force, the Babbar Khalsa, the All–
India Sikh Students Federation, the Khalistan Liberation 
Army, the Dal Khalsa and the Dashmesh Regiment. At 
least two of these groups, the Babbar Khalsa and the 
Dashmesh Regiment were believed to be active overseas, 
particularly in Canada and West Germany.
By the time organised terrorism in India, as elsewhere 
had been able to acquire newer weapons in an age when 
sophisticated technology was not contained by national 
boundaries. At the peak of terrorism in Punjab between 
1988 and 1991 there were 5,000 to 6,000 hard core 
militants enjoying the active support of another 10,000 
to 15,000 people. Pakistan supported the insurgency by 
providing arms, training and sanctuaries. Hand guns 
were used initially, but by 1987 the terrorists had assault 
rifles, sniper rifles and rocket launchers. Very soon 
they were using mortars and sophisticated explosive 
devices (Narayanan, 1994, p.110). The terrorist outfits 
had kept pace with the Indian state in arms race. While 
the state’s armed forces compete with their Pakistani 
counterparts by bidding for the latest weaponry, bombers 
and submarines from the West, the terrorists had been 
buying from the same source armaments that suit their 
own military tactics. Gradually, the Punjab police built up 
the members and developed the motivation, confidence 
and skills needed to prevail. The country including the 
Sikh community supported the ruthless counter–terror 
approach that the Punjab police pursued using tactics that 
noted the fine line between what is legal and what is not 
(Gupta, 1995,p.28). Effective interdiction of Pak border 
crossings and the weariness of Sikh funders abroad also 
contributed.
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, the tradition of violence in independent India has 
expanded widely and became an integral part of day-
to-day life. The language of gun is a decisive force in 
political discourse in India. It is gradually edging out 
debates in a democratic framework, and suppressing 
dissent of the traditional humanitarian variety. India has 
been troubled by sectarian violence for decades, reflecting 
a constant conflict between its federal system and ethnic 
and regional aspirations (Leventhal and Chellaney,1988, 
p.3). But the recent growth and expansion of terrorism 
across the nation strikes at the very heart of India’s 
constitution and democratic system as a whole.
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